America already tried imperialism in the Middle East – and it failed

Every so often, like an old man rising from a nap, the new imperialists raise their voices, full of nostalgia and amnesia, crying out for the old ordered days of empire.

Without exception, these cheerleaders for empire have never experienced the reality of it: they have never been among the soldiers maimed, blinded and killed in defence of a far-off ruling class. They have never been among the subjugated, ruled by a foreign power, resisting by any means at hand.

So it is with this latest longing for an imagined past, coming from Robert Kaplan, an American author best known for expansive essays about geopolitics (usually leavened with a healthy dose of belief that American military power can solve most problems).

Read more: http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/america-already-tried-imperialism-in-the-middle-east–and-it-failed

#geopolitic, #imperialism, #middle-east, #us

Countdown From ISIS to IS-Less – Obama Says We Underestimated Strength

President Obama announced today (9/30/2014) that the US intelligence community was caught off guard by how fast ISIS grew in Syria. Not only is this a befuddling statement, that the intelligence community could have been completely caught off guard, but it is amazing that the President would throw them under the bus. In reality, plenty of information has been available and the intelligence community has been hitting back saying they did have their eye on the ball.

How Could President Obama Have Underestimated the Power Of ISIS in Syria?

President Obama and White House Staff must have been sitting in their offices with their “Eyes Wide Shut!” If nothing else, one has only to go to twitter or Facebook to get a blow-by-blow of ISIS events. ISIS enjoys publishing their conquests and their bad acts for the world to see.

Senator McCain’s response to the President’s comment that ISIS took the US by surprise was “that is not true. He said, “it has been clear ISIS has been a growing concern in Syria for some time.”

Maybe the President gets his information from the news talk shows. There are many reasons why people are confused about Syria, if the only place they are getting their information is from self-proclaimed experts and “pundits.” Many people are giving their “educated guess” about the situation in Syria. They talk about the qualifications of the Syrian Revolutionary Forces (FSA), however, they do not pre-qualify their assessment with specific information that defines how they have become an expert on military expertise. It seems that a lot of these “experts” are labeling the FSA as “incompetent.”

Read more: http://newsblaze.com/story/20141001041634kaj1.nb/topstory.html

#daesh, #isis, #khorasan, #us

Why there’s no US Close Air Support for the YPG in the Kobanê AO

Truth2Pwer
@YallaSouriya Why there’s no US Close Air Support for the YPG in the Kobanê AO: http://tl.gd/n_1sc5e16
================

26th September 2014

Why are there no Airstrikes against ISIS around Kobanê

• Turkey and the PKK are preparing to resume hostile actions against each other due to
Turkey’s TSK (army) and Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı, MİT (National Intelligence Agency) active
support for ISIS against Kurdish YPG forces in Syria. The existence of Rojava and the
possibility that the cantons would declare independence is considered a direct threat to the
Turkish State far more than ISIS. That ISIS is the greater threat from within is not fully
appreciated by MİT and the Erdoğan government.

• Turkey considers YPG as the same as PKK and supports ISIS (despite public
protestations & denials) as ISIS has been in an existential fight with Kurds from its
beginning as an offshoot of Jabhat al Nusra

• The United States still lists the PKK, and by association, the YPG as “Terrorist
Organizations”, originally at Turkey’s behest, and any public delisting will have severe
consequences between the US and Turkey. This remains the reality despite US air assets
working in support of the PKK and JPG in the Shingal Mountain operations

• Long-term, the US and others still want a recalcitrant Turkey within NATO, and is willing
to overlook the current “problems” with the current Erdoğan led Turkish government.
NATO’s Southern Command is situated at Incirlik Air Base near Adana. The United States
also has facilities at Incirlik.

• Under the Erdoğan government, Turkey has gradually been forging a foreign policy that
envisions itself as being a more independent regional power, along with an armaments
sector that for the past decade has intensified efforts to become a first tier defense supplier.

• Turkey is quietly threatening a deterioration of relations with the US and NATO unless they
cooperate with Turkey against the Kurds, using closer cooperation with Russia and China
as well as friendlier relations with Iran as a stick. Pronouncements by the Turkish
government earlier this year seeking bids from Chinese defense supplier CPMIEC for its
HQ-9 air defense system is part of this maneuvering. The raison d’être for this action is to
put the US and NATO on notice to back off on quiet criticism of Turkey’s foreign policy shifts
in recent years.

• When Turkey threatened to work with China in improving its Air Defense infrastructure, its
NATO partners understood this would necessitate sharing NATO information with the
Chinese in order to integrate what NATO air defense Turkey has integrated with, including
sensitive proprietary NATO information and software.

• Another example (amongst others):Turkey, is one of only two countries flying the US made
F-16 that has the source code for this aircraft, and if relations with the US and NATO go into
deep freeze, it is likely China and others would have access to this valuable source code for
both commercial aftermarket sales and their own avionics development. It is no secret that
Chinese military aviation is following and adopting US Mil Standards in developing Chinese
aircraft.

• In short, Turkey is blackmailing the US and NATO.

• AND THAT IS WHY THE US HESITATES IN LAUNCHING AIRSTRIKES AGAINST ISIS IN AND
AROUND KOBANE. THE ONE WORD ANSWER? TURKEY…
___________________________________________________________________________________

27 September 2014
In a new development, in the morning hours of 27 September, US airstrikes inched further west from ISIS-held Tel Abyad when tanks were hit in the ISIS-held town of Ali Shar, east of Kobanê.

• This followed President Erdoğan indicating that Turkey’ will “engage” ISIS by creating a
‘buffer zone’ along the Turkish frontier. Speaking more to Turkey’s tactical intent, this
development is directed towards the PKK and YPG forces. Recent days have had both
the Turkish government and the PKK indicate that renewed hostilities may begin in
October. After several months of improving relations, it appears that the Erdoğan
government has, over the summer, openly increased its support to ISIS in its operations
against Syrian Kurds, and in the process, angered operational PKK commanders. The
YPG, YPJ, PKK, and PJAK are connected as members of Koma Civakên Kurdistan,
KCK. The Turkish government makes no distinction amongst these groups and sees the
diminishment or demise of Rojava as a strategic objective.

• The ‘buffer zone’ will not so much be directed against ISIS, as it will be a tactic against
the PKK and its allies. This will nonetheless afford Erdoğan the cover that he is now
active against ISIS and in step with putative western allies. In theory this would cut off
ISIS from Turkish support in a definitive manner, but the selective porosity of any buffer
zone will remain as something to observe.

• It is possible that as Turkey deploys the TSK along its borders into Syria, that Turkish
disagreements with US airstrikes designed to assist the YPG will become muted,
providing diplomatic cover for Turkey’s shift in tactics that are actually directed at the
PKK and not against ISIS. That the US is quietly displeased with Turkey, and has been
for some time, is indicated by the increased US intelligence effort directed at Turkey in
recent years as doubts about that country’s foreign policy and the AKP approach to
consolidating power increased.

• That said, it is likely with this ‘public’ shift by Turkey, the US will be freer to conduct air
support for PKK ally the YPG without having to de-list the PKK from its ‘terrorist
organization’ list. The possibility remains as the United States discovers that the only
dependable and organized force against ISIS are the YPG/YPJ and their allies and the
only secure base to operate from is Rojava, that support for the above will quietly
develop. If so, the US may coordinate with the YPG from its tactical operations center
near Erbil Airport, something that will be welcomed by the PUK and Gorran, but not
necessarily by the KDP.

The recent rapprochement between the YPG and some FSA units, along with the
continued slide in the influence of the SNC will factor into such possible developments.
While the White House may be reluctant to go down this path, evidence is mounting that
the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs under General Martin Dempsey is
coming to recognizing this strategic reality. Again, the Turkish dilemma is a major factor
in any movement in this direction, and also is moving upstream against President
Obama’s desire to limit the US’ involvement in the Syrian Conflict.

#kobane, #turkey, #us

US Lacks Responsible Foreign Policy To Deal With…

US Lacks Responsible Foreign Policy To Deal With ISIS

By Kimberly Jones

On August 29th, President Obama addressed the United States (and the rest of the world) regarding various issues. The primary issue on his agenda, and the agenda of most Middle Eastern listeners was ISIS (aka The Islamic State). ISIS has been growing like a cancer in Syria for the past two years. They leave death and destruction wherever they go. Due to their inscrutable relationship with the Assad regime, ISIS has been able to develop a strong hold in Syria which they consider the base of their caliphate. A strong hold that continues to grow and that no one has been able break.

The Free Syrian Army and the Islamic Front have been fighting ISIS and the Assad regime on what they thought was two separate fronts, but now it is clear that the two fronts have been colluding. This explains why it has been so difficult to cage the monsters. It isn’t only ISIS and Assad that the Syrian Freedom Fighters are faced with, because Assad and ISIS participate in a Terror Network that is lead by Iran. Iran has supplied their Revolutionary Guard into the warscape; as well as, arms, munitions and vehicles. The other terror network member is Hezbollah which also routinely supplies men well armed, with their own transportation.

Syrians Know Obama Does Not Have Their Back

During his press briefing, the President of the United States announced to the world the US has “NO STRATEGY” for dealing with ISIS. In Syria, the suffering has been so costly … physically, emotionally, economically, as well as, for infrastructure, and history. Hearing the “NO STRATEGY” announcement, after having asked the US repeatedly for leadership and direct assistance was like “the straw that broke the camels back” for many Syrians.

This statement especially took Syrian Americans by surprise:

Post by Hamdi Rifai.

What has become painfully clear to Syrians (Muslims, Kurds. Druze, and Alawites (many of whom are standing up against Assad) is that the US does not have their back. If the US decisionmakers do not start listening to “the right people,” the US will continue being the foreign policy fool, and lives throughout the Middle East and North Africa will continue to perish. Or Russia will fill the vacuum

More reading http://newsblaze.com/story/20140901022104kaj1.nb/topstory.html#sthash.WDjr9sED

#foreign-policy, #is, #middle-east, #us

Syria: There Is No Arm's-Length Solution

By Frederic C. Hof

Geneva II was an attempt to fill that which nature abhors: a vacuum. Yet the vast emptiness of US policy toward Syria swallowed the effort itself, making it seem tiny, silly, and futile. President Bashar al-Assad’s regime calculated that it could treat the initiative with contempt. Although the opposition delegation in Geneva acted with competence and dignity, it could not alter or avoid facts on the ground; it could not dispel the belief on the part of the regime, Tehran, and Moscow that there is indeed a military solution for the Syrian crisis, a solution that is very much a work in progress.

The supposed absence of a military remedy to Syria’s travails has been the central talking point of a strategy-free approach to the crisis by the West, led—if that is the proper word—by the United States. The regime, Russia, and Iran may well be wrong that the uprising against crime family rule can be beaten by force of arms. Yet the West’s incantation to the contrary is by no means the product of rigorous, dispassionate analysis. Rather the United States and its allies simply have no appetite for trying seriously to affect the military situation inside Syria. The West has offered no meaningful counter to those who supply strategic arms, inject foreign fighters, and facilitate war crimes and crimes against humanity, all in an attempt to win a war outright. Ergo there is no military solution. It is as if the fact that one chooses not to play somehow means that the game itself does not exist.

That one side thinks it can win a battlefield decision gives it a perfectly logical sense of what a diplomatic outcome should entail: the other (losing) side suing for peace. The West, going into Geneva II, aimed to break new ground in the theory and practice of diplomacy: the party prevailing on the battlefield should do the decent thing and yield power. The self-serving doctrine of no military solution for Syria was even projected onto Russia in the hope that Moscow would prevail on its murderous client to stop shooting and graciously step aside. US leaders now voice disappointment in Russia’s Geneva II performance, suggesting a degree of surprise. One might just as usefully express shock over the dietary habits of the hyena.

Rather than speciously proclaiming the impossibility of a military decision in Syria, the administration might instead argue that US interests are not engaged by what happens in Syria; at least not to the extent that a serious effort to affect the military situation would be merited. One could argue that although regime atrocities against civilians easily represent the premier human rights abomination of the twenty-first century, there are similar (albeit smaller scale) abuses around the globe, so on what basis would one intervene in one place and not others? One could maintain that the only sort of military gesture that would really matter in Syria would be the Iraq-like invasion and occupation of the country. One could warn that even a military mission aimed precisely at killing the delivery systems that drop barrel bombs and other explosives on the defenseless would put the United States on a slippery slope to yet another Middle Eastern war.

Indeed, all of these arguments—or excuses for inaction—have already been made, some quite explicitly by President Barack Obama. One of his top aides reportedly even advanced the argument that Syria would be a wonderful place for Iran to have a bloody, drawn-out, Vietnam-like experience: a morality-free proposition offering Syrians a twist on the Will Rogers observation that, “Anything’s funny as long as it’s happening to someone else.” Perversely, however, the hand-wringing and excuse-making—the transformation of “never again” to “well, maybe just this once”—has made a bad situation incalculably worse and is now forcing the administration to reconsider the “no military solution” cop-out and its corollaries.

That which is forcing reconsideration is that which brought the United States to the brink of military action in Syria in August 2013: the palpable contempt of the Assad regime for the President of the United States. Starting in 2012 the regime deliberately crossed President Obama’s chemical weapons red line more than a dozen times. On August 21, 2013 the red line crossing was simply too obvious and too public to ignore. The administration’s subsequent (and proper) proclamation that the regime’s action would not stand could have been made any number of times previously, when the regime’s use of chemicals against civilians was just as improper, just as illegal, and just as immoral. That which was different in August was a challenge to US credibility worldwide, one so blatant that it could not be swept under the carpet.

Much the same thing has happened in the context of Geneva II. The Assad regime began, in the lead-up to the conference, to slow-roll its compliance with the very chemical weapons agreement that had erased the credible threat of US military force in September 2013. Then, as the conference began and went through two inconclusive rounds, the regime actually picked up the pace of its war on civilians, producing record levels of non-combatant deaths, injuries, and refugee flight. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Bashar al-Assad, a person often ridiculed as weak and clueless during his more than thirteen year tenure as Syria’s president, has taken the measure of the man in the White House—the one who called on him to step aside and who warned him about red lines—and has decided that, with the help of Iran and Russia, victory is possible and impunity automatic.

When it comes to the reputation of the United States, what happens in Syria does not stay in Syria. If Bashar al-Assad can pretend to be the peer competitor of the US president, what conclusions will be drawn by Iran as the P5 + 1 get down to business trying to negotiate a nuclear accord? How is the Benito Mussolini of the twenty-first century—Vladimir Putin—processing the spectacle of Geneva II? Are there dangerous, destabilizing (mis)calculations being arrived at in various parts of the globe as a result of the Geneva II debacle and what it says about the seriousness of the Unite States?

There are no magic solutions—military or diplomatic—for the catastrophe that is Syria. Starting in late 2012 and extending throughout 2013 and into 2014, the Rafik Hariri Center of the Atlantic Council has offered specific ideas on Syria-related objectives, strategy, and the kind of process required to produce actions transcending the kind of sloganeering that now passes for strategic communication. It is understandable that the administration has wanted to keep Syria at arm’s length—who wouldn’t, if only it were possible? Yet that which was understandable is no longer defensible. There is no arm’s-length solution for Syria. If the administration wants a new mantra—one with the merit of accuracy—that would be it.

http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/syria-there-is-no-arm-s-length-solution#.Uwlf6Tdmkt0.twitter

#geneva-2, #inaction, #negociations, #russia, #us, #war