It would be ridiculous to ask what the Syrian opposition and its supporters had done to prepare in anticipation of Trump’s win, and the situation would not be better if the question was only about what the opposition did while waiting for Obama’s departure. What is even more ridiculous is that waiting for Obama’s official departure may be followed by another sort of waiting — the traditional wait until Trump appoints his administration and it begins its work, and this wait could be accompanied by notice of Trump’s temperament, and its volatility, which invites for waiting for his mood to flip in favor of the revolution or waiting for the realization of his promise to abandon the nuclear agreement with Iran and then the upcoming confrontation.
In this period of waiting, Moscow has mobilized its arsenal to change the facts on the ground. This was not a surprise except to those who wish to appear surprised. The battle on the ground was not a stalemate in the first place, and the fact that the losses of the rebel groups has been justified by the enemy’s superior firepower and massive increase in allied militias does not change the facts. Despite the evident valor of the fighters, in the end it is hard to win a semi-conventional war when the opposing side dominates in equipment and fighters, and of course with the loss of a reliable ally and continuous supply lines.
It is true that the conflict went outside its Syrian framework when Tehran directly intervened, by means of its Revolutionary Guard and Lebanon’s Hezbollah, and after that by employing a number of Shiite militias, which left the Syrian arena wide open to regional conflicts. However, it is also true that the opposition, both politically and militarily, did not work to strengthen its internal structure for a long confrontation with the regime and also to comprise real weight to prevent some of them being used in accordance with the whims of foreign powers. We can say that the opposition in as much as it neglected its internal depth, depended on the widening discontent against the regime, and so lost its power toward the outside world whether in terms of political representation whose weight has receded steadily since 2012, or in military terms, at the same time, where it began finishing off any ambition to establish a collective national military formation.
See more: http://syrianobserver.com/EN/Commentary/31975/Opinion_Our_Opposition_and_Era_Trump